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Public Input Competition
and Public Service Providers
Kosuke Oshima*
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) has become popular in many countries. At the same
time, the capital ﬂow across countries and regions has increased, which gave rise to the
ﬁscal competition for capital among governments. An early study that investigated these
two trends together argued that competition in public-input investment hardens the budget
constraints of local governments. Another study, however, showed that poorly endowed
regions give up competition and hence competition does not discipline local governments.
In the present paper we assume that private ﬁrms, as well as local governments, can provide
public services and show that poorly endowed regions invest more in the production of these
services than well-endowed ones.
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I. Introduction
After the privatizations and deregulations in the 1980’s, both developed and developing countries
worked on further restructuring of the public service provisions. They often cooperated with
private ﬁrms to provide public services more eﬃciently. Those approaches are collectively referred
to as the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). The measures of PPP include the Private Finance
Initiative (PFI) developed in the United Kingdom, Concessions, and other types of cooperation
between public and private sectors. In a broader sense, certain kinds of privatization and public
enterprises may be included.
PFI was introduced in public services such as roads, prisons, hospitals and others, and has
generally been successful in reducing public spendings. Other types of PPP were introduced
in various public services such as waterworks, libraries, railroads and others. PPP has been
investigated with contract theories and other approaches. Examples of those studies are Schmidt
(1996a,b), Hart et al. (1997), Hart (2003) and Bennett and Iossa (2006). A typical approach
has been, as in Hart (2003), to investigate when the government chooses “bundling” in which
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building and managing facilities are contracted in a bundle (PPP), or “unbundling” in which
they are contracted separately (traditional public-works projects).
During the same period, according to the globalization of the economy, the capital began to
ﬂow across countries and regions more rapidly and in a larger scale. The governments began
to compete with each other to attract the capital, which is called the ﬁscal competition among
countries and regions.
Fiscal competition among governments has been studied intensively for more than two decades.
Following the formal analyses by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), the models
of tax competition have been extended in various areas such as competition between countries
(or regions) of diﬀerent sizes, and that for diﬀerent tax bases (i.e. the preferential tax regimes).1)
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) also analyzed the competition between countries using public
input, or the investment in infrastructure, and argued that the level of public input is ineﬃciently
low under the ﬁscal competition. This encouraged further studies such as Noiset (1995), Keen
and Marchand (1997), Matsumoto (1998) and Bucovetsky (2005).
While the literatures of ﬁscal competition and PPP have mostly been studied separately, they
are becoming more related with each other because the competition among governments can af-
fect the performance of the PPP projects. An early example which studied such a situation is
Qian and Roland (1997) who argued that the ﬁscal competition hardens the budget constraints of
local governments competing each other, which would otherwise bail out failed public enterprises.
On the contrary, Cai and Treisman (2005) assumed asymmetric regions which diﬀer in exoge-
nous endowments and showed that competition does not necessarily discipline local governments;
some governments give up competition and spend money on wasteful purposes. Although public
enterprises do not appear in their model, their results are quite a contrast to those of Qian and
Roland (1997).
We sometimes ﬁnd similar cases to Cai and Treisman (2005) in the sense that some local
governments give up competition. While PPP is considered to reduce public spendings, local
governments in some regions provide public services themselves rather than contracting with
private companies. This suggests that PPP may be diﬃcult in those regions. Figure 1 shows the
relation between per-capita income and the rate of introducing the Designated Manager System
(one form of PPP) in public services of 47 Japanese prefectures.2) One can see that wealthier
regions (supposedly better-endowed in geography or others) tend to be more willing to cooperate
53Public Input Competition and Public Service Providers
Figure 1: Regional income and the rate of introducing PPP
with outside organizations such as private ﬁrms. If PPP helps reduce public spendings, this seems
contradictory because poorly endowed regions should be more eager to introduce PPP.3)
In this paper we assume that private ﬁrms, as well as local governments, can provide public
services by investing (private or public) capital and show that governments in poorly endowed
regions invest more in those services and less in infrastructure than governments in well-endowed
ones. This is in line with the cases where local governments in rural areas give up competing
with other regions to attract private capital, and produce public services themselves rather than
contracting with private companies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up a model and analyze the
two cases when capital is immobile and when it is mobile across regions. Section III provides
numerical examples. Section IV concludes.
II. The Model
We consider an economy that consists of N +M regions indexed by i. Of these regions, N are
well endowed (type-n) in some geographic characteristics and their productivity is higher than
M poorly endowed (type-m) regions given other conditions. Regions of the same type are equally
endowed. We mainly focus on the public side of the economy and production in each region
is that of public services such as constructing and managing waterworks, libraries, prisons, and
others. Both the government and private ﬁrms can produce those services.
Private investors own a total amount of capital KP , invest in diﬀerent regions and establish
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public service providers. Let kiP denote the private capital invested in region i. We assume that
there exists a capital market where governments pay the return to these investors. Private in-
vestors invest their capital so that the returns from diﬀerent regions are equalized. Governments
can also produce public services by investing capital, denoted by kiG. At the same time, govern-
ments choose the level of infrastructure investment Ii. Infrastructure includes transportation,
telecommunications, legal protection and others which increase the productivity of capital kP
and kG.
Suppose that the aggregate production function of region i, F (Ai, kiP , k
i
G, I
i), takes the form
of Cobb-Douglas type as in Cai and Treisman (2005) except that we have two types of capital:
F i = Ai(kiP + k
i
G)
α(Ii)β (1)
where α > 0, β > 0, α+ β < 1 (which implicitly assumes other immobile factors such as labor),
and Ai > 0. The parameter Ai denotes the level (or eﬀect) of regional endowment. We assume
that Ai = An for the well-endowed regions, Ai = Am for the poorly endowed regions, and
An > Am. While kiP and k
i
G (in other words, private and public enterprises) are substitutable,
endowment, infrastructure, and capital are complementary.
Residents of each region owns the equal amount of capital k¯P , where k¯P =
∑N+M
i k
i
P /(N +
M). The government of region i (hereafter government i) maximizes the regional welfare ui, which
consists of the values of public services net of payment to the capital, xi ≡ F i − r(kiP + kiG), and
capital income of the region r(k¯P + k
i
G), where r denotes the return from capital and therefore
r = ∂F i/∂kiP . From (1), x
i is expressed as follows:
xi = (1− α)Ai(kiP + kiG)α(Ii)β . (2)
We assume that the regional welfare ui takes the following form:
ui = u
(
xi, r(k¯P + k
i
G)
)
= xi + r(k¯P + k
i
G)
which means that the net values of public services and capital income are equally evaluated.
Unlike Cai and Treisman (2005), we do not assume wasteful government expenditure. Each
government is endowed with revenue S > 0 and invests kiG and I
i. The budget constraint of the
government i is as follows:
Ii + kiG = S. (3)
55Public Input Competition and Public Service Providers
The identical revenue S represents some national mechanism of ﬁscal redistribution across regions.4)
The assumption of identical revenues is just for simpliﬁcation and the results are basically un-
changed if we introduce the tax on capital, as shown in the Appendix.
Consider a game in which all governments decide the level of infrastructure Ii and capital
investment kiG, then private investors decide the level of capital investment k
i
P . We compare two
cases, where private capital is immobile (or the amount of capital invested in each region is ﬁxed)
and where it is mobile across regions.
1. Immobile Capital
First we consider the case where private capital is immobile and allocated equally across regions,
that is, kiP = k¯P . This can be interpreted that the amount of capital is historically determined.
The problem for government i is to maximize xi + r(k¯P + k
i
G) subject to (3). Therefore the
Lagrangian is as follows:
L = xi(kiG, I
i; k¯P ) + r(k¯P + k
i
G) + μ(S − Ii − kiG). (4)
Solving this we have,
∂xi
∂Ii
=
∂xi
∂kiG
+ r. (5)
Given (2), rearranging (5) yields the following condition:
Ii =
(1− α)β
α(2− α) (k¯P + k
i
G). (6)
From (3) and (6) we can solve kiG and I
i as follows:
kiG =
α(2− α)
B
S − (1− α)β
B
k¯P (7)
Ii =
(1− α)β
B
S +
(1− α)β
B
k¯P (8)
where B ≡ (1 − α)β + α(2 − α) > 0. Because (1 − α)β/B is positive, (7) and (8) show that
kiG decreases and I
i increases as k¯P increases. Therefore, if larger amount of private capital is
available, the government reduces its investment of public capital and increases the infrastructure.
On the other hand, kiG and I
i increase in the revenue S because α(2 − α)/B is also positive.
The productivity parameter Ai has no eﬀect on kiG and I
i. This is diﬀerent from Cai and
Treisman (2005) who assume a public consumption good (or wasteful public spending) other
than the investment in infrastructure, in which larger productivity causes more investment in
infrastructure.
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2. Mobile Capital
Next we assume that private capital is mobile across regions costlessly. Then the capital ﬂows
from regions with lower return rates to those with higher rates and the rates are equalized in
all regions. Let r denote the economy-wide rate of return to capital. From (1), the condition
∂F i/∂kiP = r can be rewritten as follows:
kiP + k
i
G =
(
αAi
r
(Ii)β
) 1
1−α
. (9)
Because kP is mobile, increasing I
i attracts more private capital. Diﬀerentiating (9) yields,
∂kiP
∂Ii
=
β
1− α
(
αAi
r
) 1
1−α
(Ii)
α+β−1
1−α =
β
1− α (k
i
P + k
i
G)(I
i)−1. (10)
Government i maximizes xi + r(k¯P + k
i
G) subject to (3). Therefore, from the Lagrangian
L = xi(kiP , k
i
G, I
i) + r(k¯P + k
i
G) + μ(S − Ii − kiG), (11)
we have the following condition:
∂xi
∂Ii
+
∂xi
∂kiP
∂kiP
∂Ii
=
∂xi
∂kiG
+ r. (12)
Given that r = ∂F i/∂kiP and using (2), we obtain the following equation:
Ii =
β
α(2− α) (k
i
P + k
i
G). (13)
Comparing (6) and (13) we can see that given the level of the capital, governments invest more
in infrastructure if the private capital is mobile. 1/(1 − α) > 1 is so called “competition eﬀect”
on the infrastructure investment. From (9) and (13) we can solve Ii and kiP + k
i
G as below:
Ii = C1−α
(
αAi
r
) 1
1−α−β
(14)
kiP + k
i
G = C
β
(
αAi
r
) 1
1−α−β
. (15)
where C ≡ {β/[α(2−α)]}1/(1−α−β). Substituting (14) and (15) into (3) and rearranging we have,
kiP = (C
β + C1−α)
(
αAi
r
) 1
1−α−β
− S (16)
kiG = S − C1−α
(
αAi
r
) 1
1−α−β
. (17)
The market-clearing condition for private capital NknP (r)+Mk
m
P (r) = KP along with ∂F
i/∂kiP =
r determines the rate of return r, and hence kiP , k
i
G, and I
i. Therefore, although the revenue S
does not appear in (14), the increase in S would lower r and hence raise Ii.
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From (14) and (15) we have the following condition:
In
Im
=
knP + k
n
G
kmP + k
m
G
=
(
An
Am
) 1
1−α−β
. (18)
This shows that as An/Am increases (i.e. the diﬀerence of endowments is larger), (knP +k
n
G)/(k
m
P +
kmG ) and I
n/Im become larger. Unlike Cai and Treisman (2005), however, one cannot tell imme-
diately whether In increases and Im decreases (both may increase or decrease).5) This is because,
even though knP becomes larger and k
m
P becomes smaller, k
n
G and k
m
G may not increase or decrease
accordingly. From (16) we have,
knP + S
kmP + S
=
(
An
Am
) 1
1−α−β
. (19)
Because S is identical across regions and the market-clearing condition holds, knP increases and
kmP decreases as A
n/Am increases. Besides, from (18) and (19) In/Im = (knP +S)/(k
m
P +S), and
hence we have In/Im < knP /k
m
P . That is, the private capital is invested in better-endowed regions
more than proportionally to the infrastructure investments. On the other hand, comparing (18)
and (19) and given that kiG < S, in order for (18) to hold, k
n
G must decrease and k
m
G must
increase as An/Am increases. Therefore, In increases and Im decreases, which says that poorly
endowed regions give up competition in infrastructure investment. See Figure 2 for an example.
In addition, if An/Am is large enough, the competition eﬀect is overturned in poorly endowed
regions; the investment in infrastructure is lower when capital is mobile than when it is immobile.
In kG
kGI
m
n
m
kP
m
kP
n
type-n
type-m
S
Figure 2: An example of capital allocation
The result above can be summarized as follows. While poorly-endowed regions may give up to
compete with well-endowed regions with infrastructure investment, they invest larger amount of
public capital and produce more public services themselves. This is how poorly-endowed regions
rest on government production of public services rather than private production.
III. Numerical Examples
In this section we review the results in the previous section using numerical examples. We assume
that S = 10, α = 0.25, and β = 0.2 throughout.
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1. Immobile Capital
First, suppose that capital is immobile as in Subsection II.1, k¯P = 5, A
n = 1.5, and Am = 1.
Then the equilibria are shown as in Table 1. One can see that there is no diﬀerence in the
allocation of government budget between well-endowed and poorly endowed regions (although
the production levels are diﬀerent).
Table 1: Immobile capital
I kG k¯P
type-n region 3.83 6.17 5
type-m region 3.83 6.17 5
2. Mobile Capital
Suppose next that there are same number of type-n and type-m regions (say, j regions for each
type) and total amount of private capital KP = 10j (i.e. the average amount of private capital
per region is ﬁve). Table 2 shows a case where the diﬀerence between An and Am is small
(An = 1.1, Am = 1.0). Infrastructure investments are larger than the case of immobile capital
in both regions because of the competition eﬀect. In Table 2, however, nearly two-thirds of the
private capital is invested in type-n regions.
Table 2: An/Am is small
I kG kP
type-n region 5.11 4.89 6.30
type-m region 4.30 5.70 3.70
Table 3 shows a case where the diﬀerence between An and Am is larger (An = 1.4, Am = 1.0).
One can see that with a forty percent diﬀerence of productivities (An/Am = 1.4), more than
ninety percent of the private capital is located in type-n regions. In addition, Im is smaller than
in Table 2, which can be interpreted that type-m regions gave up competition with type-n regions.
If An/Am becomes even larger, kmP will be zero, or we have corner solutions. Then type-m regions
can no longer attract private capital and only public enterprises provide public services in those
regions.
Table 3: An/Am is large
I kG kP
type-n region 6.10 3.90 9.45
type-m region 3.31 6.69 0.55
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IV. Conclusions
In this paper we assumed government capital investments, in addition to private capital invest-
ments, to produce public services. While these two types of capital are substitutes, capital and
infrastructure are complements. We have two types of regions, one with higher regional en-
dowment (type-n) and the other with lower endowment (type-m). When they determine the
allocation of capital and infrastructure investments to maximize regional welfares, it was shown
that type-m governments invest less in infrastructure than type-n governments. That is, type-m
governments give up the competition with type-n governments for private capital. Instead, they
invest more public capital and produce public services themselves. The larger the diﬀerence in
endowments, the more private capital is located in type-n regions and eventually type-m regions
have to do without private capital.
While PPP is beneﬁcial, it is possible that some regions cannot aﬀord it. In that case, it
is no use criticizing those regions for not contracting with private ﬁrms. One remedy might be
for the central government to help local governments invest more in infrastructures to increase
productivity, although actually it may not be eﬃcient. Another one might be to increase Am to
attract private capital. That would be, for example, to improve bureaucratic procedures so that
private companies can move in easily.
In the present paper public and private capital are perfect substitutes and there is no diﬀerence
between public and private enterprises. In reality, however, they have their drawbacks and
advantages respectively. Introducing those features is for future research.
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Appendix
We now introduce a unit tax on private capital and see whether the result in Section II holds.
As in Cai and Treisman (2005) the tax rate t is given by the national government. Therefore
local governments raise tax revenues from capital and are endowed with S. Then the budget
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constraint of government i is,
Ii + kiG = S + tk
i
P . (3’)
If the private capital is immobile (kiP = k¯P ), the Lagrangian is as follows:
L = xi + r(k¯P + k
i
G) + μ(S + tk¯P − Ii − kiG).
Solving this we have,
kiG =
α(2− α)
B
S − (1− α)β − α(2− α)t
B
k¯P (7’)
Ii =
(1− α)β
B
S +
(1− α)β(1 + t)
B
k¯P (8’)
where (1−α)β−α(2−α)t in (7’) is positive as long as the tax rate t is small enough (for example,
α = 0.25 and β = 0.2 as in Subsection III.1 and t = 0.2). Then the increase in k¯P decreases k
i
G.
If t is large enough (for example, t = 0.5), however, (1 − α)β − α(2 − α)t is negative and the
increase in k¯P may raise k
i
G. As in Subsection II.1 the increase in k¯P raises I
i.
If the private capital is mobile, the condition for equal marginal productivity ∂F i/∂kiP = r+t
can be rewritten as,
kiP + k
i
G =
(
αAi
r + t
(Ii)β
) 1
1−α
. (9’)
Therefore we have
∂kiP
∂Ii
=
β
1− α (k
i
P + k
i
G)(I
i)−1. (10’)
Solving the government’s problem yields,
∂xi
∂Ii
+
∂xi
∂kiP
∂kiP
∂Ii
=
(
∂xi
∂kiG
+ r
)(
1− t∂k
i
P
∂Ii
)
. (12’)
Using (10’) we have,
Ii =
D
E
(kiP + k
i
G) (13’)
where D ≡ (1− α)β + α(2− α)βt > 0 and E ≡ α(1− α)(2− α) > 0. Using (9’) and (3’) yields,
Ii =
(
D
E
) 1−α
1−α−β
(
αAi
r + t
) 1
1−α−β
(14’)
kiP =
1
1 + t
{(
D
E
) 1−α
1−α−β
+
(
D
E
) β
1−α−β
}(
αAi
r + t
) 1
1−α−β
− S
1 + t
(16’)
kiG =
1
1 + t
{
t
(
D
E
) β
1−α−β
−
(
D
E
) 1−α
1−α−β
}(
αAi
r + t
) 1
1−α−β
+
S
1 + t
. (17’)
Therefore, similar discussions hold as in Subsection II.2 and one can say that poorly endowed
regions give up competition while well-endowed regions attract private capital.
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Notes
1) For tax competition between countries of diﬀerent sizes see Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson
(1991). Studies of preferential tax regimes include, for example, Janeba and Peters (1999),
Keen (2001), Janeba and Smart (2003) and Oshima (2010). For surveys, see Wilson (1999),
Zodrow (2003) and Wilson (2006).
2) Public housings are excluded because their numbers are so large and vary greatly by prefec-
ture. See Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications (2009). The data of per-capita
income of prefectures are from Cabinet Oﬃce, Government of Japan (2010).
3) Yamauchi et al. (2009) showed that while PPP is eﬀective to reduce costs, Japanese cities
facing ﬁnancial diﬃculties tend to be negative toward PPP. They suggest that those cities
may face the soft budget constraints, expecting the bailouts by the central government.
4) In Germany, for example, there exists the local equalization system across federal states and
across municipalities. The local allocation tax in Japan is for ﬁscal redistribution across
prefectures and municipalities. See Werner (2006) and Mochida (2006)
5) In Cai and Treisman (2005), there is no public capital kiG and the corresponding equation
to (18) is In/Im = kn/km = (An/Am)1/(1−α−β). Because the total amount of capital is
ﬁxed, it follows that In increases and Im decreases.
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